Tagged: U.S. Supreme Court

SCOTUS Provides Clarity to Charterers in Oil Spill Case and All Parties Subject to OPA Should Take Note

On March 30, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision that will directly affect those in the maritime charter industry, and may ripple out to anyone performing a cleanup or defending a claim under the Oil Pollution Act (OPA). The case began with a 1,900-mile voyage by the M/T Athos I, which was a 748-foot single-hulled oil tanker, from Venezuela to Paulsboro, New Jersey in November 2004. Only 900 feet from the ship’s intended destination, it struck a nine ton anchor that was abandoned in the Delaware River. The anchor pierced the hull of the vessel and caused over 250,000 gallons of crude oil to spill into the river, which resulted in a $133 million cleanup. Frescati Shipping Company, the owner of the ship, together with the United States, paid for the cleanup as required under OPA, and then sought its cleanup costs from the charterer, CITGO Asphalt Refining Company (“CARCO”). The question before the High Court was “whether the safe-berth clause is a warranty of safety, imposing liability for an unsafe berth regardless of CARCO’s diligence in selecting the berth.” Frescati and the U.S. argued that CARCO breached the charter-contract’s “safe-berth” clause, which obligated CARCO to designate a safe-berth where the ship would be able to come and go “always safely afloat.” CARCO,...

Supreme Court Rules That Statute of Repose Trumps Class Action Tolling

The Supreme Court has given a boost to companies defending against securities claims, ruling in California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ Securities that a statute of repose cannot be extended by the doctrine that the filing of a class action tolls the statute of limitations for the claims of absent class members. The case emanated from a prior class action that had alleged, in connection with certain offerings by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., violations of Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, which relates to misrepresentations and omissions made in a securities registration statement. Section 13 of the Act provides that any such claim must be brought within “three years after the security was bona fide offered to the public.” CalPERS, which was an absent class member in the original class action, filed its own class action complaint more than three years after the transactions at issue and then opted out of the original class action. Affirming the decisions of the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court held that the three-year limit in Section 13 is a statute of repose, and that such a limit cannot be extended by any court-made tolling doctrine. CalPERS argued that the statute was tolled under American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah during...

Update: U.S. Supreme Court Announces New Test for Defining “the Parcel” in a Regulatory Taking

On March 22, 2017, we blogged about the importance of the United States Supreme Court’s looming decision in Murr v. Wisconsin – a regulatory takings case that was poised to resolve a key question long left unanswered by the Court’s takings jurisprudence: how do you define the relevant parcel in determining a regulation’s impact on “the parcel as a whole?” On June 23, 2017, the Court issued its ruling, and in a 5-3 decision answered definitively that it depends. Sometimes a regulation may go so far as to effect a “taking” of one’s property. In determining when a regulation has gone so far, the Court has previously instructed that reviewing courts must consider the regulation’s interference with property rights “in the parcel as a whole.” But the precise boundaries of “the parcel” are not always clear and, in many cases, may prove to be dispositive of whether there was a taking at all. The Court described the problem in Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, explaining that because the regulatory takings analysis requires a comparison between the value taken from the property to the value which remains, “one of the critical questions is determining how to define the unit of property whose value is to furnish the denominator.” In Murr, the Court was presented with a number...

U.S. Supreme Court Requires Schools to Provide a Special Needs Student More Than a “De Minimis” Education

On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court handed down a unanimous ruling in Endrew F., et al. v. Douglas County School District RE-1. In a decision that will have far-reaching implications in the area of special education, the Court held that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) “requires that students with disabilities be provided with an educational program that is reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” In 1982, the Supreme Court determined in Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley that the IDEA requires that every child be provided with a free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”). The Rowley Court did not, however, adopt a standard for determining whether a child is receiving a sufficient educational benefit to satisfy this mandate. Rather, the Court stated that a child has received a FAPE if the Individual Education Plan (“IEP”) provides an education program “that is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits,” and otherwise limited its analysis to the facts of the Rowley case. Endrew F., an autistic child, was enrolled in a public school and educated pursuant to an IEP. In 4th grade, Endrew’s parents expressed displeasure with his progress and challenged the...

U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies Statute of Limitations for Constructive Discharge Claims

On May 23, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Green v. Brennan, held that the statute of limitations for a constructive discharge claim begins to run when the employee gives notice of his or her resignation, not at the time of the employer’s last allegedly discriminatory act giving rise to the resignation. The “constructive discharge” doctrine refers to a situation in which an employer discriminates against an employee to the point that the employee’s working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would feel compelled to resign.

The U.S. Supreme Court Decides Who is a “Supervisor” for Title VII Purposes

Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Vance v. Ball State University, one of the most-anticipated decisions of the Court’s 2012 Term. The Vance case concerns who is considered a “supervisor” for purposes of establishing an employer’s liability for hostile work environment harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, from which the case arose, and other lower courts which had defined “supervisor” to include only those individuals who possess the authority to fire, demote, promote, transfer, discipline or take some other tangible action against a harassment victim. The Court rejected the definition of “supervisor” proposed by the federal government, appearing as amicus curiae, and found in the EEOC’s Enforcement Guidelines, which links “supervisor” status to the ability to exercise direction over the victim’s daily work.